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Abstract
The stock market of China experienced an abrupt crash in 2015 and evapo-
rated over one third of the market value. Given its associations with fear and
fine-resolutions in frequency, the illiquidity of stocks may offer a promising per-
spective of understanding and even signaling the market crash. In this study,
by connecting stocks that mutually explain illiquidity fluctuations, a illiquidity
network is established to model the market. It is found that as compared to
non-crash days, the market is more densely connected on crash days due to
heavier but more homogeneous illiquidity dependencies that facilitate abrupt
collapses. Critical socks in the illiquidity network, in particular the ones in sec-
tor of finance are targeted for inspection because of their crucial roles in taking
over and passing on the losing of illiquidity. The cascading failures of stocks
in market crash is profiled as disseminating from small degrees to high degrees
that usually locate in the core of the illiquidity network and then back to the
periphery. And by counting the days with random failures in previous five days,
an early single is implemented to successfully warn more than half crash days,
especially those consecutive ones at early phase. Our results would help market
practitioners like regulators detect and prevent risk of crash in advance.
Keywords: illiquidity, complex network, market crash, cascading failures,
warning signals
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1. Introduction
The stock market occupies the most profound role in the financial systems
of modern economies like China. An abrupt stock market crash, like the one
of 2015 that evaporated around 15 trillion yuan in wealth, therefore could be a
cartographic shock to the economics and bring about huge losses to the whole
society. In fact, how to understand the market crash and implement early warn-
ings has been an important issue and trending topic not only in finance but also
interdisciplinary fields after the crisis. While it is conventionally thought that
market crash might be a typical black-swan event, which is hardly predicted
due to sophisticated factors beyond and unexpected entanglements with ex-
ternal systems. Nevertheless, the associations between investor behaviors, like
expectations, emotions and imitations and the market performance, especially
their power in return predictions [1, 2], imply that trading behaviors may pro-
vide a new but promising perspective of probing and warning the market crash.
In particular, details of every trading decision in high-frequency records fur-
ther offer a manner of big-data proxy to investigate the collective behavior of
investors, either before, during or after the market crash.
Liquidity, referring to the spread between bid price and ask price, inherently
reflects expectations of investors towards the future performance of stocks in
their elementary trading decisions. And illiquidity, which inversely originates
from the pessimism of investors, would thus increase the crash risk since it dis-
solves the effective price information and disseminates panic across the market.
Given the significant impact from investor emotions, especially the negative
ones [3, 4], illiquidity can also be contagious, e.g., scared investors on stocks of
illiquidity incline to sell out other stocks on hands to keep their own liquidity
and reluctantly result in more stocks of illiquidity. Hence, in order to model
the market crash from a system view, it would be natural to connect stocks of
similar illiquidity fluctuations and build a network to represent the market. In
the accordingly established illiquidity network, links among stocks stands for
the possibilities of cascading crash across the market, suggesting a new angle
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of profiling the market crash dynamics. Though it is indeed not a new idea to
transform a market into a network, linking stocks in terms of illiquidity is rarely
visited. More importantly, different from previous networking models of mutual
fund sharing [5] or price co-movements, illiquidity can be captured dynamically
in a fine-resolution, i.e., in the most minimum decision granularity of bid and
ask. It means that in terms of elementary decisions in trading and their con-
tagions, the illiquidity network provides a very micro-perspective of the market
crash.
Although there are lots of literatures on stock market crash, results on crash
forecasts are still inadequate and more efforts are desperate. Unlike many emerg-
ing financial markets, however, the China stock market is unique since it is dom-
inated by individual investors [6]. Contrary to their institutional counterparts,
individual investors are more emotional and susceptible, meaning they are more
likely to be scared, spread panic and overly react to external disturbs. They
even imitate trading strategies and help forge the herding in market. These
characteristics might undermine the challenges that make crash hard to predict
and suggest the possibility of detecting the crash of China market at early days.
In terms of illiquidity, the trading behaviors in extreme market situations can
be finely examined from the micro perspective, helping identify the sources of
market volatility and extreme stock price movements. In addition, the anomaly
in the evolution of illiquidity networks can also be probed from the differences
between crash days to non-crash days, which paves the way to develop the
warning signals of market crash.
Inspired by above motivations, this study aims to profile, explain and warn
the China market crash through the illiquidity network. The illiquidity of stocks
is defined and derived from 2.3 billion trades in 2015, from which profound
associations between illiquidity and negative emotions of investors like fear are
disclosed. The illiquidity dependency between stocks, measured by the mutual
information, can surprisingly distinguish crash days from those non-crash ones.
And it is also inspiring that the market is more connected and homogeneous
due to heavier and lower-deviated illiquidity dependencies on crash days. While
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in the illiquidity network, influential stocks in crash are found to be the ones
with large capital values or belonging to the sector of finance. The dynamics
of the crash is also profiled in the illiquidity network as cascading failures of
losing illiquidity from stocks of smaller degrees to the ones of higher degrees
that usually locate in the core and then out to the fringe. More importantly,
an early signal, which simply counts the days without systemic failures in a
window of previous five days is presented to accurately warn more than half
crash days in 2015. Our results decently demonstrate the power of illiquidity
network in understanding market crash of China and would help practitioners
in particularly the regulators inspect risky stocks and prevent possible crash in
advance.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 reviews literatures.
Section 3 introduces our datasets and the methodology of measuring illiquidity.
Section 4 presents the results from illiquidity networks. Section 5 concludes the
paper with a brief summary and suggestions for future research.
2. Literature review
Due to the late development of China’s stock market and the obvious gap
with developed foreign markets, there have been some unique features of the
Chinese stock market discussed among the academic scholars and practitioners.
On the one hand, Yao et al. indicated that Chinese investors exhibit different
levels of herding behavior [7]. On the other hand, Xing and Yang found that
the increased correlation among the stocks could ignite market crash [8]. Fur-
ther, Tian et al. found that institutional investors (primarily pension funds)
provide stabilizing effect during extreme market-down days [9], unlike Dennis
and Strickland who revealed that institutional investors magnify extreme mar-
ket movements by buying (selling) more on return-up (return-down) days in
the U.S. markets [10]. Although there are many related studies in either China
market or foreign ones, no detailed explanations and early warning signals of
stock market crash have been given to prevent risks. In the meantime, the
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dominant occupation of individual investors in China market also implies the
possible abnormality in trading behaviors that can be sensed and detected as
warnings before the crash.
In fact, previous efforts have already suggested that the stock market crash
is closely related to illiquidity. Amihud et al. presented evidence linking the
decline in stock prices to increased illiquidity using the method of bid-ask spread
during the market crash [11]. As return is more comparable to price, related
research on associations between return and illiquidity has increased rapidly.
Amihud and Bekaert et al. stated that there is a positive correlation between
stock returns and illiquidity in terms of the daily ratio of absolute stock return
to its dollar volume and the proportion of zero return days, respectively [12,
13]. Furthermore, Nagel indicated that the main reason of the evaporation of
liquidity during crash is the increasing expected returns of liquidity [14]. Even
more inspiring, measuring illiquidity, e.g., through bid-ask spread, is deeply
rooted in the minimum decision granularity of daily trading and thus can be
inherently derived from highly frequent trading records of investors. And also,
illiquidity contains future economic information which can be employed for stock
market forecasting [15, 16]. Therefore, it is feasible to explore stock market
crash from the perspective of illiquidity, but existing examinations still lack
explanations, cascading dynamics, and warning signals of the crash.
Illiquidity may also be influenced by both internal and external factors in-
cluding stock attributes, policies and industry, which should be considered in
understanding the market crash. Stoll et al. suggested that stock attributes
such as market value, volume and volatility can significantly reshape the stock
illiquidity [15, 16, 17]. On the other hand, An et al. found that macro economic
factors such as media independence, policy uncertainty, default risk and fund-
ing conditions have a remarkable impact on illiquidity [18, 19, 20, 21]. These
evidences imply that stocks can be well profiled in terms of illiquidity and more
importantly, external shocks to the market can also be absorbed and thus sensed
through illiquidity. In addition, the illiquidity of individual stocks co-varies with
each other [22, 23, 24, 25, 26], suggesting in essence that illiquidity can be con-
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tagious across the market.
Modeling market as a network of stocks to examine the crash is a new and
promising approach in recent efforts. Stocks can be connected due to price
correlations or common investors [5]. By removing failed stocks, e.g., reaching
the down-limit and transactions being suspended, the market crash can then
be reflected through the falling apart of the network. The topology evolution
before and after the 2008 financial crisis of South African, Korean and Chinas
stock markets were investigated [27, 28, 29], respectively, in which the minimum
spanning trees (MST) are carefully examined. Li and Pi proposed a complex
network based method to understand the effects of the 2008 global financial
crisis on global main stock index [30]. besides, Bosma et al. use network cen-
trality to identify the position of the financial industry in the network, which
can be a significant predictors of bailouts [31]. In particular, the turbulence in
20152016 were probed by transforming China stock market into a complex net-
work, showing that there exist influential stocks and sectors within the market
crash [5, 32]. Nevertheless, connecting stocks because of illiquidity associations
is rarely considered in constructing the market network. The absence of estab-
lishing illiquidity networks in existing studies on market crash will spark up new
perspectives in this paper.
To sum up, although extensive efforts have been devoted on the association
between stock illiquidity and market crash, few insights are available on illiq-
uidity networks based on high-frequency transaction data. Given the closeness
between stock illiquidity and both internal and external factors of the market,
probing the crash from the perspective of illiquidity networks could offer more
insightful observations and explanations. Moreover, the dominance of individ-
ual investors in China stock market also indicates that the trading abnormality,
which can be grasped by illiquidity and its contagion in a fine resolution could
produce novel signals to warn risks before the crash. From a interdisciplinary
view, a big-data proxy based on tremendous trading records before, during and
after the 2015 crash of Chinas stock market will be employed to measure illiq-
uidity, establish networks, examine crash dynamics and detect warning signals.
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3. Dataset and methods
3.1. Dataset
The data sample employed in this study consists of stocks selected from the
Shenzhen Stock Exchange and the Shanghai Stock Exchange in 2015, i.e., more
than 2500 stocks and a total of 244 trading days. In particular, transaction
records of the minimum trading decision granularity include ask price, ask vol-
ume, bid price, and bid volume for every second of every stock. The dataset
is provided by the Wind Information (Wind Info), a leading integrated service
provider of financial data in China.
June 12nd:SHCOMP index hit new high
           of 5178.19
June 27th:The People's Bank of China cut 
           interest rate by 0.25% to release 
           the liquidity
July 2nd:
Special verification of suspected 
market manipulation by CSRC
July 4th, July 5th:
Premier Li returned to rescue the market
July 8th:The China Insurance Regulatory 
Commission had relaxed the regulatory 
ratio of blue-chip stocks invested in 
insurance funds
Aug.24th:2170 stocks down to
lower limit, which becomes the
biggest decline since February 
2007
Aug.25th:2000 stocks down to 
lower limit, the SHCOMP index 
fell below 3000
June 19th:The first market crash, 1067 
           stocks down to lower limit
Figure 1: Review of key events of the market crash in 2015.
Then, for identifying the stock market crash, the crash days are defined
as days whose number of stocks being sell-off to the down limit (the allowed
maximum one-day drop of a stock, i.e., ten percent of its closing price last day)
is more than 800 . Specifically, as seen in Figure 1, in 2015, there are 17 trading
days on which the stock market was crashed, including June 19th, June 26th,
June 29th, July 1st, July 2nd, July 3rd, July 6th, July 7th, July 8th, July 15th,
July 27th, Aug.18th, Aug.24th, Aug.25th, Sept.1st, Sept.14th, Oct.21st. And
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other days before or after these crash ones will be defined as non-crash days and
consist the counterparts for further comparison.
3.2. Measuring illiquidity
The transaction data is full of noise due to the too much frequent occurrences
of quote. In order to filter out noise and smooth the data, a fixed time window of
one minute is selected to average the spread. Note that as compared to previous
study, one minute is short enough to reflect the investment behavior of investors
at the smallest decision granularity. Besides, it is necessary to convert the length
of data sequence into 237 minutes for every stock in a day for the reason that the
Shenzhen Stock Exchange adopts collective bid for the last three minutes. With
respect to the illiquidity, various methods have been presented to calculate it
for different occasions and purposes. The methods on low-frequency data work
great when high-frequency data is not available [12, 33, 34, 35, 36], but it is
still undeniable that approaches based on high-frequency data perform better
since richer information and higher accuracy [19, 37]. Here the illiquidity is
expected to sense the minimum decisions in trading behavior, hence the bid-ask
spread based on high-frequency records, which is always considered to be the
best method, is selected to measure illiquidity [38, 39]. Moreover, it is known
that the size of the transaction has a great impact on illiquidity, we further
update the measure by adding the quoted amount as the weight of the spread.
The illiquidity can be noted as
It =
1
10 (
10∑
i=1
AitVit −
10∑
j=1
BjtVjt)
Pmid,t
· 10000, (1)
where Ait is the ask price of investor i at time t, Vit is the ask volume of investor
i at time t, Bjt is the bid price of investor j at time t, Vjt is the ask volume of
investor j at time t, Pmid,t is the mean of ask price and bid price at time t. It
can be learned from the definition that the lower the weighted spread, the lower
the transaction coast and the lower the illiquidity.
The potential capability of the illiquidity in understanding the market crash
can be simply illustrated in Figure 2, in which the market index is negatively
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Figure 2: Illiquidity with stock index. It is the illiquidity we measured and market index
represents the CSI 300 Index. The correlation between illiquidity and market index is -0.64
with p-value 0.00. The red dots indicate the crash days.
associated with the fluctuation of illiquidity we measured. In fact, China’s stock
market had experienced a period of ups and downs in the year of 2015, in which
period more than ten days of crash erupted in succession. Specifically, the
illiquidity continued a decreasing trend before June and at this stage investors
easily completed transactions due to lowering cost and the market index kept
soaring. In contrast, the illiquidity demonstrated an abrupt increase in June
and August, in which months the crash densely occurred and resulted high
transaction cost, inactive investors and falling market index. These observations
confirm the previously disclosed association between illiquidity and crash in
China’s stock market and inspire the following investigations from the novel
perspective of illiquidity network.
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Figure 3: Trading behaviors in crash and non-crash days. (a) shows the ask and bid volume
in market crash day of June 26th, the stocks are randomly selected from the sample. The
first sub-graph shows the stock that not losing liquidity in crash day, and the ohter two show
stocks that losing liquidity in crash day. When one of the ask or the bid does not exist, or
neither of them exists, the stock loses liquidity. (b) shows the quotation of buyers and sellers
in crash days, in which frequency is defined as how often each action occurred every minute
of the crash day, no ask means no buyers quote and no bid means no buyers quote. (c) shows
the quotation of buyers and sellers in non-crash days.
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4. Results
4.1. Illiquidity and crash
It is supposed that trading behaviors, especially the elementary actions like
ask and bid of high frequency, would be essentially influenced by shocks like
market crash. As can be seen in Figure 3(a), when stocks approached down
limit on crash days, the volume of bid experienced an abrupt decline and then
vanished, contrarily the ask volume soared, implying that many investors were
forced to sell off shares owing to panic selling and risk prevention. However,
approaching down limit might also happen on non-crash days. To further tes-
tify the impact from market crash on trading behaviors, we randomly select
ten crash days and non-crash days to compose two different groups and com-
pare the occurrence occupations of no-ask, no-bid, and no-quote when stocks
experienced down limit. It is unexpected that crash days can be surprisingly
distinguished from non-crash days. Specifically, as can be seen in Figure 3(b),
no quotations, which would result in liquidity losing, mainly comes from no-bid
on crash days instead of no-ask on non-crash days. This disguising impact from
market crash to trading behaviors further suggest that in terms of illiquidity,
whose calculations are based on both ask and bid, would inherently sense the
footprints of market crash from the novel angle of trading decisions.
Zero volume of bid but soaring amount of ask suggests that on crash days
investors are anxious and their anxiety are accumulating. As can be seen in
Figure 4(a), it is interesting that the maximum volume of ask in fact logarith-
mically grows with the duration of losing illiquidity, i.e., no-bid. At this stage,
investors can be easily affected by others, especially the spread of pessimism.
This logarithmic-like relationship also indicates that the longer the no-bid lasts,
the more anxious the investors are and the soar of ask eventually slows down.
The saturation of ask volume can be explained that investors will become less
panic when more information is obtained. From this perspective, trading actions
like ask can be directly connected to investor emotions and intuitively, illiquidity
that based on spread of ask and bid should be coupled with emotions, especially
11
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Figure 4: Max duration of illiqudity due to no bid. (a) shows the correlation between the
max ask volume and the max duration of illiqudity, which indicates the longest duration of
losing liquidity. Note that there may be several periods of losing liquidity per stock in a day.
The stock is randomly selected from the sample, and other stocks have similar relationships.
(b) shows the correlation between investors’ fear and the illiquidity, whose value is 0.44 with
p-value 0.00.
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the negative ones.
In order to empirically verify the possible associations between illiquidity
and investor emotions, the correlations between illiquidity and investor emo-
tions sensed in social media are examined. Specifically, daily emotions towards
Chinas stock market delivered by investors in social media are split into fear,
sadness, disgust, joy and anger [1]. The averaged sequence of illiquidity of the
market is accordingly aggregated into a daily sequence and its significant asso-
ciations with fear can be found in Figure 4b. The cointegration regression also
proves the accuracy since the coefficient of determination is greater than 0.7.
The found positive correlation implies that the illiquidity can well reflect, even
in a better resolution, the fear in Chinas stock market, in which individual in-
vestors dominate. In fact, it is difficult for individual investors to be completely
rational, they usually like to follow suit blindly and catch up and sell down,
causing disorder fluctuations and then spread negative emotions like fear across
market. Individual investors may follow and imitate institutional investors for
believing that institutional investors possessing more capacity to collect and
process information owing to the professional knowledge. The key, however,
is that many institutional investors are not rational as assumed, and they are
also susceptible to external shocks when dealing with information and making
decisions. Besides, even for financial professionals, fear, a potential mechanism
underlying risk aversion, might make investors divest more stocks [40]. Then
fear from those institutional investors might be magnified by following individ-
ual investors and reignite much stronger disturb that would lead to a market
crash. Hence from the perspective of negative emotions and their contagions,
the illiquidity can be contagious among stocks, suggesting that establishing a
network by connecting stocks due to mutual illiquidity dependency could offer
a new proxy of emotion contagion to finely probe the dynamics of crash.
4.2. Illiquidity networks and crash
In the stock market of China, the actual interactions coupled within stocks
are extraordinarily important because of susceptible investors. While most ex-
13
isting models forge links between stocks mainly based on the similarity of time-
series, e.g., of price and measures of Pearson and Partial correlations are ex-
tensively employed [41, 42, 43, 44]. However, the relationship between stocks is
too complicated and should not be too much simplified to neglect trading be-
haviors, investor emotions and their possible contagions. Taking the limitations
of linear correlations into account, here we use mutual information to measure
the nonlinear dependency between illiquidity of stock pairs. In fact ,the power
in reflecting nonlinear dependency of mutual information in networking market
have been previously demonstrated and emphasized [32, 45, 46].
0.3     0.4     0.5     0.6     0.7     0.8     0.9     1.0
Figure 5: The normalized mutual information (NMI) of illiquidity. (a) shows the distributions
of NMI of illiquidity on both crash(June 26th, June 29th) and non-crash(June 24th, June 25th)
days. It is clear that the globally averaged NMI is getting larger while the standard deviation
is getting smaller when the stock market is approaching a turmoil. (b) shows the mean and
standard deviation of NMI of illiquidity with all the transaction days over the year of 2015.
By calculating the normalized mutual information (NMI) of illiquidity series
in minute between all pairs of stocks, we first try to profile the distributions
of illiquidity dependency of the market on both crash and non-crash days. As
can be found in randomly selected samples in Figure 5(a), the globally aver-
aged NMI is getting larger while the standard deviation (e.g., the broadness
of the distribution) is getting smaller when the stock market is approaching
a turmoil. Drawing a mean-standard deviation graph with all the transaction
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days over the year of 2015 for ease of observation, see as Figure 5(b), it is clear
that the average mutual information will increase and the standard deviation
will decrease while in the crash days, indicating that the illiquidity network
will become more closely connected and more homogeneously coupled when the
market is in a bad situation. Because of pessimism, investors become cautious
and unwilling to participate in the transaction, which abruptly increases and
spreads illiquidity across the market and results in a crash. Besides, we also find
that the market crash demonstrates a lasting effect because the days after the
crash show the same characteristics as the day in the crash. However, regarding
to the days before the crash, as seen in Figure 5(b), they overlap with those of
non-crash and hardly demonstrate any distinct features, suggesting that from
the global and static view there is no warning signal can be detected. It in-
spires us to investigate the illiquidity network from more in-depth and dynamic
perspectives further.
In building an illiquidity network, links are weighted as NMI between their
ends illiquidity, while not all links are necessarily kept and those with less
weights, which might relatively represent random dependency among stocks
instead of plausible paths for illiquidity contagion, would be removed. Specif-
ically, the size of the giant connected component (GCC) is taken into account
for locating the critical threshold of link weight [47, 5], i.e., the value beyond
which the size of GCC starts to decline rapidly will be set as the threshold for
each trading day (see Appendix Figure A1(a)). And links with weights below
the threshold will then be omitted since their removals trivially influence the
connectivity of the market structure. The ratio of GCC in illiquidity networks
fluctuates and significantly increase on crash days, suggesting consistently that
the market will be more connected and coupled in crashes (see Appendix Figure
A1(b)). High illiquidity dependency could facilitate spread of illiquidity across
the market and low deviation of illiquidity dependency would further lead to an
abrupt collapse of the network. The positive associations between GCC ratios
of illiquidity networks and market crash indicate that the refined structures by
thresholds of link weights can be proper models of networking market.
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Figure 6: The degree-weighted occurrence proportions on different sections and capital styles
in illiquidity networks.(a) shows the proportions on different sections. Note that the pro-
portions in other sections are very similar except for the financial. Therefore, only a few
representative industries are selected to simplify the picture. (b) shows the proportions on
different capital styles of stock values, the large-cap-value is the most critical group in market
crash. As for growth stocks and balanced stocks, the results are the same, they are not shown
here in the figure.
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The illiquidity network of stock market evolves in forms of adding new links
or removing existing connections. It is found that the Chinas stock market
evolves in a high frequency, especially on crash days and only 10% links kept
on average for consecutive two trading days (see Appendix Figure A2). Highly
varying structures suggest that to target critical stocks that function profoundly
in crash can help inspect market risk. In terms of grouping stocks into different
sections or capital styles (see Appendix Table A1), a degree-weighted propor-
tion, denoted as Rij , is defined to identify key group i of stocks on trading day
j. Specifically,
Rij =
nij/nj
Nij/Nj
, (2)
where nij is the occurrence of stocks belonging to group (sector or style) i and
it is summed over all links in the network of j day, nj is the occurrence of all
stocks and it is summed over all links in the network of j day, Nij is the number
of group i in the network of j day, Nj is the number of unique stocks in the
network of j day. Accordingly, the group of stocks with higher Rij will occupy
more links in the market, meaning heavier dependency on other stocks illiquidity
and greater odds of taking over or passing on crash risk. It is unexpected that,
as can be seen Figure 6(a), the sector of finance constantly occupies the highest
proportion in Chinas stock market, especially on crash days. As for the capital
style, the style of large capitalization, i.e., the large-cap-value is the most critical
group in market crash (see Figure 6(b)). Both observations suggest that stocks
in finance, especially those of large capital values, should be targets of inspection
for market regulators.
The falling-apart of Chinas market in crash was consisted by waves of stocks
completely losing illiquidity, i.e., declining to the down limit [48]. These failure
waves produced peaks in number of newly failed stocks (see Appendix Figure
A3). Assuming that each wave of failure can be identified by a peak, then
stocks that failed before the peak could be seeding failures that lead to the
corresponding wave of losing illiquidity. Then sectors with more stocks failed
before peaks might be causes of the following collapse and thus could be targets
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Figure 7: The significance of failing before peak. The red dots indicate crash days, and the
blue dots indicate non-crash days. Sij = R
bp
ji −Rbprji , so Sij may be positive or negative. If Sij
is positive, which means stocks within i tend to fail before peaks. It is obvious that the sector
of finance failed most before peaks on crash days. In contrast, the sectors like manufacturing
and information technology perform similarly both on crash and non-crash days. Note that
Sij can not be calculated for all stocks since some of them might not appear in the illiquidity
network due to good liquidity, especially on non-crash days.
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for early inspection and even sources of warning signals. A new ratio, denoted
as Rbpij is thus defined to target critical sectors, which can be calculated as
Rbpij =
nbpij /N
bp
j
Nij/Nj
,
where nbpij is the number of stocks failed before peaks in group i on day j, N
bp
j
is the number of stocks failed before peaks on day j. To testify the significance
of failing before peaks, the timings of fail for all the stocks of one trading day
are also randomly shuffled to get a random value of Rbpij , which is denoted as
Rbprij for comparison to test significance. Then for group i, its significance of
being seeds that probably lead to a wave of failures on day j can be defined
simply as Sij = R
bp
ij −Rbprij . Intuitively, Sij will be much greater than 0 if stocks
within i tend to fail before peaks. Consistent with our above observation, the
sector of finance, as can be seen in Figure 7, failed most before peaks, especially
on crash days. In the contrary, the significance of sectors like manufacturing
and information technology just fluctuates around zero with trivial deviations.
It again suggests that stocks of finance in Chinas market might be sinks or
even triggers that produce illiquidity and spread it across the market. In terms
of inspecting these stocks of finance, market practitioners, in particular the
regulators, could sense warnings from their abnormal variations on illiquidity.
The illiquidity network can also track the dynamics of market crash. Con-
sidering peaks of newly failed stocks can be interfaces to split failure cascades,
the timing distance between the timing of losing illiquidity to the peak timing
inherently measures at which stage the stock join the crash cascade. Specif-
ically, for negative distances, smaller ones stand for the early collapse, while
for positive distances, greater ones represent the later failures in the crash (see
Figure 8(a)). We then examine the function between stock degree and the ab-
solute value of time distance, as can be seen in Figure 8(b), it is found that the
degree, in particular the maximum degree in each bin, is negatively correlated
with the distance. This negative association indicates that stocks fails nearly
the peak timing are those with high degrees, while these fail at the early state
or at the ending of the crash possess small degrees. Thats to say, the crash
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Figure 8: The correlation between stock degree and the timing distance of losing illiquidity to
the peak. (a) shows the degrees of stocks that decline to the down limit before and after the
peak. How to find and determine the peak of stocks decline to the down limit is illustrated
in Appendix Figure A3. (b) shows that greater the absolute distance, smaller the degrees of
stocks (y-axis is logarithmic). The correlation between the maximum degree and the absolute
distance is -0.66 with p-value 0.00.
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ignites from stocks of small degrees, then spread to stocks of high degrees which
usually locate at the core of the network and finally cascades to the periphery.
Though market crash in essence originates from failure of these crucial nodes
in the core, those with small degrees collapsed at the early stage might be the
real triggers. Consisting with the previous study [48], this finding discloses the
unexpected role of small-degree stocks in market crash and inspire regulators
pay more attention on those conventionally might be overlooked, especially the
ones in finance sector.
4.3. Illiquidity networks and a warning signal
Above illustrations solidly suggest the associations between illiquidity net-
work and market crash. Assuming market crash being systemic failure rather
than random error, stocks failed together in a short interval, e.g., ten min-
utes, should be inherently entangled with each other due the contagion of los-
ing illiquidity and therefore connected in our built illiquidity network. Then
the non-randomness of failures within a short interval i can be defined as
wi =
enf
nf (nf−1)/2 , where nf stocks got to the down limit in i simultaneously,
enf is the number of links among them that captured in the illiquidity network
built on the corresponding day and nf (nf − 1)/2 is the maximum number of
possible links among them. In line with this, higher wi represents more like-
lihoods of systemic failures instead of random errors, i.e., signs of crash. And
wdj = <wi> from all intervals of trading day j can be accordingly measured
to value the daily non-randomness. As can be seen in Appendix Figure A4(a),
most values of the daily non-randomness are zero and greater fluctuations sig-
nificantly occur as approaching crash days, which implies a warning signal could
be accordingly forged.
Given the fluctuations of daily non-randomness (see Appendix Figure A4(a)),
a sliding window of t days, meaning historical information of previous t days is
supposed to be helpful, is set to smooth the daily sequence and then we simply
count the occurrences of wd = 0 within the window, which is denoted as Nwd=0
to construct a warning signal. Specifically, smaller Nwd=0 suggests more sys-
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Figure 9: The warning signal of Nwd=0 = 0. Grey bars stands for non-crash days, red bars
mark crash days that can be warned in advance of one day, while those can not be warned in
advance are colored to blue.
temic failures and greater odds of leading to market crash. As can be seen in
Appendix Figure S4(b), as t = 5, an abrupt decline of Nwd=0 can be detected
one day earlier than more than half of 2015 crash days in China’s stock market,
in particular for those consecutive ones occurred at the early phase. It indicates
that if Nwd=0 = 0 in the previous five days, a warning signal should be sent
out because there would be a market crash in the next day, as seen in Figure 9.
Note that t = 5 is the optimal setting as we vary t from 1 to 15 days. It is inter-
esting that time windows with length shorter than five days result in insensitive
Nwd=0, while those of longer than five days result in disappearance of signals in
advance. The one day ahead of the crash is vital because it indicates that the
presented early warning signal can help prevent systematic risk of the market in
reality. It should also be noted that not all the crashes of 2015 can be effectively
and correctly warned (see Figure 9 and Appendix Figure A4(b)) and those on
which the signal failed might be caused by shocks that similar to random ones
on non-crash days. Besides, former crash might essentially re-structured the
stock market and make the later crash hard to predict.
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5. Conclusions
Financial systems like stock markets are vital components of modern eco-
nomics and function profound roles in economic growth. The market crash,
however, occurs occasionally and brings about huge shocks to the entire social-
economic system and even lead to a global recession. For example, the crash
of 2015 in Chinas stock market erupted unexpectedly and abruptly evaporated
over one third of market value. How to understand and warn the crash has
been an open and trending problem in not only finance but also interdiscipline.
In fact, from the view of system science, the stock market can be modeled as
a complex network and the crash can thus be cascading failures of stocks that
decline to the down limit. Nevertheless, in previous study, trading behaviors,
in particular the emotions of investors are rarely considered in networking the
market, which in essence motivates the present study.
Given the dominance of individual investors in China’s stock market, it is
assumed that abnormal decisions and negative emotions could help profile and
even warn the market crash. Illiquidity, which is defined as weighted spread
between ask price and bid price, can capture trading decisions of ask and bid in
a fine resolution of minute and is significantly associated with fear of investors,
suggesting a novel perspective of modeling the market and crash. By connecting
stocks with illiquidity mutually associated, it is found that the market is more
densely and homogeneously coupled due to great mean and low deviation of
illiquidity dependencies, which can explain the abrupt collapse of the market in
the crash. Stocks are not randomly connected and the ones with large capital
value or from the sector of finance are targeted as most influential parts in the
market crash. What is even more interesting is that the negative correlation
between maximum degrees and distances to the peak of down limit suggests
the pattern of periphery-core-periphery propagations in crash. And by simply
counting the days without systemic failures in previous five days, an early signal
is also derived from the illiquidity network to warn in advance more than half
crash days in 2015. Our results could help market practitioners like regulators
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inspect risky stocks like the ones from finance sector or with small degrees and
sense the early warning signal to prevent the crash. Our approach can also be
easily adjusted and extended to stock markets of other countries.
While we must admit that not all the crash can be warned accurately by
the proposed early signal (Nwd=0 = 0). Those crashes that our signal failed to
warn imply that the causes beyond crash can be sophisticated and some of them
might be truly caused by random shocks. How to group crashes into categories
of can be warned or not will be an interesting direction in the future work. In
the meantime, the possible entanglement between different crashes also deserves
more efforts.
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Appendix
Table S1: Sector and cap style of stocks
sector
Agriculture, Communication and cultural,Comprehensive,Construction,
Electricity, gas, water, Extractive, Financial, Information technology,
Manufacturing, Real estate, Retailing, Service, Transportation
style
Small-cap-growth, Small-cap-balance, Small-cap-value
Mid-cap-growth, Mid-cap-balance, Mid- cap-value
Large-cap- growth, Large- cap-balance, Large- cap-value
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Figure A1: The threshold of link weights. (a) shows the sizes of the giant connected component
(GCC) and the second largest connected component as the threshold of link weights increase.
The value beyond which the size of GCC starts to decline rapidly will be set as the threshold
for each trading day, it is found that the value can be well captured when the decline of size is
more than 1%. Considering that the size of the second largest connected component is small,
the GCC can well represent the entire network. (b) shows that the threshold fluctuates with
time, but increases greatly during the crash days (the red dots indicate crash days), suggesting
consistently that the market will be more connected and coupled in crash.
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Figure A2: The evolution of links in illiquidity networks. (a) shows the size of new links,
reduced links and unchanged links for consecutive two trading days. It is found that the
Chinas stock market evolves in a high frequency, especially on crash days. (b) shows the ratio
of unchanged links which indicates that only 10% links kept on average for consecutive two
trading days.
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Figure A3: The peaks of stocks down to limit. The principle of determining the peak is that
the number of stocks mentioned above is the largest relative to the previous period and the
subsequent period. As can be seen, there may be multiple peaks within a day.
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Figure A4: The warning signal. (a) shows the likelihoods of systemic failures instead of
random errors. The red bar indicates crash days, and the blue bar indicates non-crash days.
(b) shows the occurrence of wd = 0, i.e., the daily non-randomness is zero within five days,
which is denoted as Nwd=0 to construct a warning signal. Specifically, smaller Nwd=0 suggests
more systemic failures and greater odds of leading to market crash. As can be seen, an abrupt
decline of Nwd=0 can be detected one day earlier. It indicates that if Nwd=0 = 0 in the
previous five days, a warning signal can be implemented to warn a market crash in the next
day.
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